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ABSTRACT 
Numerous evolutionary linguists have indicated that human pointing 
behaviour might be associated with the evolution of language. At an 
ontogenetic level, and in normal individuals, pointing develops 
spontaneously and the onset of human pointing precedes as well as 
facilitates phases in speech and language development. 
Phylogenetically, pointing behaviour might have preceded and 
facilitated the evolutionary origin of both gestural and vocal language. 
Contrary to wild non-human primates, captive and human-reared 
nonhuman primates also demonstrate pointing behaviour. In this 
article, we analyse the debates on pointing and its role it might have 
played in language evolution from a meta-level. From within an Applied 
Evolutionary Epistemological approach, we examine how exactly we can 
determine whether pointing has been a unit, a level or a mechanism in 
language evolution. 
KEYWORDS: Applied evolutionary epistemology, Evolutionary 
linguistics, Units, Levels, Evolutionary mechanisms, Pointing. 
1. Introduction 
During the last decennia, scholars from a variety of disciplines, including 
psychology, primatology and (evolutionary) linguistics, have demonstrated an 
increasing interest in pointing. Three reasons for this tendency can be given.  
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For one, although cultural differences have been reported, index-finger or 
canonical pointing appears to be universally present in humans. Several 
scholars (Tomasello, 2000; Butterworth, 2003, 14–16; Kita, 2003; Povinelli, 
Bering, & Giambrone, 2003) have therefore suggested that index-finger 
pointing is a universal human trait that, to some extent, might also be 
biologically determined.  
Secondly, the pointing behaviour extends the purely physical and 
behavioural domain because it is often associated with communicative 
behaviour, such as vocalizations and gaze alternations (Povinelli, Bering & 
Giambrone, 2003, p. 38), or the first and two-word phase (Butterworth, 
2003, p. 28; Masataka, 2003, pp. 72–74; Goldin-Meadow & Butcher, 2003); 
as well as cognitive behaviour such as intentionality (Tomasello, 2000, 2004; 
Tomasello & Call, 1997), or problem solving (Leavens, 2004; Leavens, 
Hopkins, & Bard, 2005, 2008).  
Finally, in natural settings nonhuman primates apparently do not point 
while captive apes do. Significant differences can be detected in the pointing 
behaviour of captive apes who are merely institutionalized (in e.g. zoos or 
medical research centres), and apes who have been home-reared or language-
trained. Especially within the latter group, declarative pointing is part of the 
behavioural repertoire, while institutionalized apes only display imperative 
pointing (Leavens, 2004; Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 2005). Tomasello 
(2000, 2003, 2004; Tomasello & Call, 1997) therefore defines pointing 
based upon the presence or absence of intentionality. The latter however, is a 
motivational state that is hard to be proven to be present on a scientific, 
observational level. And Leavens (2004, pp. 390–392) therefore proposes 
instead that pointing is defined as “an act of nonverbal reference”. Leavens, 
Hopkins, & Bard (2005) also counter the idea that pointing is a biologically 
determined trait. Instead, they provide evidence that it are ecological, 
epigenetic factors, such as an inability to move freely in space, that results in 
the emergence of pointing behaviour in both humans and captive apes. They 
therefore argue that pointing, as an adaptive behavioural response to 
environmental conditions, is a type of problem-solving behaviour. 
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2. What Inferences Can We Draw from Pointing Studies 
 on Language Evolution? 
Pointing is one of the behaviours that is widely studied in both our species and 
others and the results of these studies therefore lend themselves perfectly for a 
thorough analysis of how the behaviour might be implicated in human language 
evolution. Its ontogenetic association with certain milestones in human 
language development, and the fact that pointing behaviour is also displayed by 
captive apes makes adherents of both a gestural as well as vocal origin of 
language assume that pointing is one of the first non-verbal communicative 
acts that humans evolved towards language. Pointing, as an act of nonverbal 
reference, is easily imitated and pointing facilitates gestural as well as vocal 
communication. Pointing might therefore also facilitate the origin of language 
during a proto-linguistic, proto-lexical phase (Arbib, Liebal, & Pika, 2008; 
Corballis, 1992; Jackendoff, 1999; Zlatev, Persson & Gärdenfors, 2005; 
Zlatev, 2008). But how can we move beyond mere assumptions and prove such 
a claim to be correct? 
For something to evolve rather than to originate de novo during many 
generations of individuals, that something must form an entity or unit, 
whereupon evolutionary mechanisms can be active, and a locus or level must 
exist where these evolutionary mechanisms can act on these levels. If we want 
to identify pointing as a behaviour relevant for the evolution of language, we 
have to be able to identify the evolutionary mechanisms whereby pointing 
evolved, and the level or locus where such an evolutionary process took place. 
Applied Evolutionary Epistemology (AEE) (Gontier, 2010b, 2012) is a 
scientific and philosophical methodology that enables one to identify 
phenomena under study as either a unit, level or mechanism of evolution. It 
combines the tenets of Evolutionary Epistemology (Gontier, 2006; Gontier, 
Van Bendegem & Aerts, 2006) with the research methodologies associated 
with Universalizing Evolutionary Theory. In regard to natural selection theory, 
Evolutionary Epistemologists (Campbell, 1974, 1997; Hull 1981), 
Philosophers of Biology (Brandon 1982) and Evolutionary Biologists 
(Lewontin 1970) have engaged in abstracting universal heuristics or 
"skeletons" of the selection mechanism to enable the evolutionary study of 
sociocultural phenomena; and they have engaged in contemplating the nature 
of units and levels of selection. Applied Evolutionary Epistemology combines 
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both approaches and applies them to phenomena and biological theories not 
addressed by the founders of the Modern Synthesis.  
Pointing is indeed such a behaviour not addressed by the classic 
evolutionary biologists who argued that the phenotype as a whole, or only 
genes evolve. Pointing provides us with a very complex behavioural repertoire, 
that, if present under similar conditions across and within species over long 
periods of time, must somehow be an outcome of evolutionary processes.  
Which role pointing played in the evolution of language, and how pointing 
might be seen as a causal factor in the evolutionary origin of language is 
presently unknown. This is partly due to the complexity of the pointing 
behaviour. Pointing is a heterogeneous behaviour that is displayed 
differentially according to different physiological and ecological factors. It is 
present under different circumstances in humans and other primate species. It 
is a purely physical behaviour that is enabled by a series of motor activities, but 
it also appears to correlate with cognitive, emotional and linguistic behaviour. 
Sometimes, pointing is highly specifically defined (e.g. canonical pointing), 
sometimes it is very broadly defined (to include e.g. foot pointing, full-hand, 
middle finger or lip pointing, Wilkins, 2003, pp. 174–180). This also means 
that pointing itself is a theoretical concept that, according to the definition 
given, differentially groups several (sub)behaviours. As such, the investigation 
of the evolution of pointing might even be worth an independent study and this 
kind of evolution might then be implicated in the evolution of language. 
Primatologists, linguists, psychologists, etc. might profit from the act of 
understanding pointing as a kind of evolution, just as “language evolution”, or 
“the evolution of life” is a kind of evolution. 
Secondly, because pointing is heterogeneously defined and the physical 
pointing behaviour itself is made up of several components, one must regard 
pointing as a behaviour dividable into several subunits. And pointing might be 
regarded as a superunit and this superunit might be implicated in the origin of 
language. The evolution of pointing might turn out to be part of the evolution 
of language (as a unit, level, or mechanism), but additionally, it might also turn 
out to be involved in the evolution of cognition, ToM, problem-solving, 
culture, etc. 
How then, did (all these types of) pointing evolve? By which mechanisms, 
and at which loci? And how and when did it influence the evolution of 
language? Is pointing a unit of language evolution? Or a level where nonverbal 
communication can emerge and become the target of evolutionary 
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mechanisms? Or is pointing itself a mechanism that enables nonverbal and 
verbal communication? At present, we don’t really know. Our top priority is 
therefore to try and answer these questions. 
Following an applied evolutionary epistemological approach, it is 
suggested that one tries to identify pointing as either a unit, level or 
mechanism of language evolution. AEE follows 3 simple heuristics, discussed 
at length in Gontier (2010a, 2010b) that explains how one can identify a 
phenomenon as either a unit, level, or mechanism. In what follows, we apply 
these heuristics to pointing and investigate whether pointing is or is not a unit, 
level or mechanism in language evolution. 
3. Is Pointing a Unit in Language Evolution? 
Because pointing combines so many different behaviours, we can call it a 
superunit, that is decomposable into subunits. We will only be fully able to 
examine the role pointing had in language or any other kind of evolution if all 
its subunits are identified; if we know how all of these subunits interact to form 
a superunit; and if we have a clear view on how this agglomeration of units 
evolved (i.e. at what levels and according to which evolutionary mechanisms 
these subunits and the superunit evolve). The latter data are not available yet, 
so what follows can only be of a tentative nature. Nonetheless, it is interesting 
to see what pointing, understood as a superunit, can possibly introduce into 
the field of evolutionary linguistics when it is framed in accordance with the 
Applied Evolutionary Epistemological approach. Table 1 outlines a set of 
research questions that allow one to identify, examine and evaluate how 
pointing might be a unit of language evolution. 
3.1. Discussion of Table 1 
3.1.1. The Question Mark Phase (1) 
Pointing is, under certain circumstances, a behaviour displayed in several (but 
not all) primates, including humans. How many types of evolution this  
behaviour is involved in needs further investigation. It is associated with 
physiological (muscle movements, motor maps), behavioural, nonverbal 
referential/communicative (declarative and imperative pointing), and 
cognitive abilities (problem-solving, intentionality, ToM); as well as with  
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Table 1. Is pointing a unit in language evolution? 
(read from left to right and top-down) 
? 1. Try to prove that pointing is a unit of language evolution (1 example 
suffices). Thus go to yes. 
YES 
 
2. Where? 
At which level is 
pointing the subject 
of language 
evolution?  
Not one level found? Pointing is not a unit, go 
to no. 
One/multiple 
level(s)? Identify them 
all. (Justifies that 
pointing is a unit.) 
How, by which 
evolutionary 
mechanism(s) did 
pointing evolve? 
Identify them all. 
3. Since when?  
 
When did pointing first originate in time and 
when did it become a unit of language 
evolution? 
4. How does the 
pointing unit 
interact with other 
units?  
Can this unit be divided into one or several 
subunits? 
If so, are they also units in language evolution? 
Can this unit be absorbed into one or several 
superunits? If so, are they also units in language 
evolution? 
5. Can this unit be 
regarded as a level 
and/or mechanism 
of language 
evolution? 
? & yes: try and treat pointing as a level and/or a 
mechanism, go to level and/or mechanism. 
6. Relevance? Is pointing sufficient and/or necessary for 
language evolution? 
NO 7. Level and/or 
mechanism? 
? or Yes: go to level and/or mechanism. 
No: treat pointing as irrelevant for language 
evolution until proven otherwise. 
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certain environmental circumstances (sociality, culture, emotionality, 
exogenous barriers). Physiology, behaviour, nonverbal communication, 
cognitive abilities, sociality, culture, etc. are all highly likely involved in 
language evolution (either as units, levels or mechanisms). It is however 
uncertain whether pointing is a direct or indirect unit of language evolution. 
At present it is thus uncertain whether (aspects of) pointing is (are) a unit of 
language evolution. In such uncertain situations the heuristic recommends to 
try and prove that pointing is a unit in the evolution of language and thus to go 
to YES. 
3.1.2. The Yes Phase (2–6) 
Identifying Pointing as a Unit of Language Evolution: Where, at which Level, 
and How, by which Mechanism did Pointing Evolve? (2) 
If it is indeed a unit in the evolution of language, pointing should evolve at one 
or multiple language evolution level(s), according to one or more evolutionary 
mechanism(s). Therefore, the first question that needs to be asked is where, at 
which level(s) the unit “pointing” evolves and how it evolves at that level (by 
means of which evolutionary mechanisms)? 
Here again, the heterogeneous nature of “pointing” highly complexifies 
the problem. Not one but a series of behaviours are characterized as pointing 
and pointing can be divided into several subunits. All these subunits can evolve 
at several levels and according to several (different) evolutionary mechanisms.  
When we evaluate the works of the above described authors, possible levels 
are: the genetic (if there are pointing gene complexes), the neuronal (if it is 
underlain by motor maps), the ontogenetic (if it is learned), the 
epigenetic/environmental, the cognitive (if it is a form of ToM), the socio-
cultural, the nonverbal communicative and the linguistic level. 
Identifying something as a unit of evolution implies that we not only 
identify the levels but also the mechanisms whereby this unit evolved. The 
heuristic therefore also asks by which mechanisms pointing possibly evolved at 
these various levels. 
If there are genes implicated in pointing behaviour, it is likely that they, like 
other genes, are the result of random mutations that became the subject of 
natural selection or random drift. 
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If pointing evolves at the neuronal or cognitive level, again various 
mechanisms must be involved. Cognitive and neuroscientists however are only 
beginning to identify the various mechanisms involved in the evolution of the 
mind and the brain, and research on how pointing is neurologically underlain is 
therefore dependent upon progress made in these particular fields. 
Pointing might also evolve anew, in each generation, at an ontogenetic level 
by individual learning mechanisms, formal or informal instruction such as 
observational learning, imitation, operant conditioning, classic conditioning, etc.  
At the epigenetic/environmental level, pointing might evolve as an adaptive 
behavioural/problem-solving response, or mechanisms such as niche 
construction might be involved where caregivers for example create an 
environment that facilitates pointing behaviour. 
If pointing evolves at the cognitive, cultural, linguistic or nonverbal 
communicative level, we again need to identify the mechanisms whereby 
pointing evolves at these levels. Here too mechanisms such as instruction, 
niche construction, and the ratchet effect might facilitate the evolution of 
pointing at these levels. 
In other words, pointing can only be proven to be a unit of language 
evolution if scholars are able to scientifically demonstrate that pointing indeed 
evolved at either one or multiple of these levels by means of a certain 
evolutionary mechanism. Then, and only then, can we identify pointing as a 
unit in language evolution. 
If we are not able to identify a level where pointing evolved, it cannot be a 
unit of language evolution and the heuristic advises to go to the no-phase (7). 
On a meta-level, it becomes obvious how the heuristic is a genuine 
question-generating device. It is a search engine or, in other words, a unit, 
level and mechanism detecting device. The heuristic says when to begin 
research, when to stop investigating a certain research avenue, and what steps 
need to be taken to conduct research. 
One superunit such as pointing can introduce a series of subunits (index-
finger pointing, all fingers extended pointing, middle-finger pointing, etc), 
levels (e.g. the genetic, ontogenetic, cognitive, cultural level, etc.) and 
mechanisms (e.g. natural selection, the ratchet effect, niche construction, 
operant conditioning, etc.) of language evolution. Research on pointing 
therefore implicates, identifies and justifies the study of numerous phenomena 
that are possibly involved in language evolution which can then become studied 
in and of themselves as possible units, levels and mechanisms involved in the 
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evolution of language. In particular, studying pointing as a possible unit of 
language evolution implicates that it is worthwhile to study whether the 
genome, ontogeny, the environment, cognition, culture, non-verbal 
communication and verbal communication are levels of language evolution. In 
turn, this requires that all the latter are also studied as independent “kinds of 
evolution”. And, pointing alone justifies the study of how natural selection, 
drift, formal or informal instruction mechanisms (i.e. observational learning, 
imitation, operant conditioning, classic conditioning, etc.), spontaneous 
generation (i.e. individual learning), the ratchet effect, niche construction, the 
Baldwin effect, problem-solving, and epigenetics are mechanisms possibly 
involved in language evolution. 
Another immediate consequence of the fact that several units, levels and 
mechanisms appear implicated in the evolution of pointing also generates a 
series of questions that up until now have not been raised enough by the 
evolutionary linguistic, evolutionary epistemological and evolutionary 
biological community. Namely, how is it possible that several mechanisms are 
active upon a unit at multiple levels? And how do the different evolutionary 
mechanisms simultaneously interact with each other in regard to the same 
unit? For example, how do niche construction, the ratchet effect and operant 
conditioning interact in regard to the evolution of pointing at the level of 
culture? Do these mechanisms compete, cooperate or co-evolve? And how do 
the different levels interact with each other in relation to the unit? These 
questions all require evolutionary epistemological and evolutionary biological 
answers and as such, they provide a challenge to the latter fields. 
Examining Pointing as a Unit of Language Evolution (3–6) 
Returning to the heuristic, once one has identified several levels of language 
evolution where the unit evolves according to different mechanisms, one has 
identified pointing as a unit in the evolution of language. In this stage of the 
heuristic, a series of questions are generated that allow one to systematically 
generate, constrain and evaluate this unit of language evolution. More 
specifically, the following epistemological questions are raised. 
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When Did Pointing Become a Unit in Language Evolution? (3) 
The “since when” question, asks about the (single or multiple) origin(s) of the 
unit in time, both in the origin of language, as well as in the general course of 
evolution. It is important to distinguish between the latter two, because 
pointing might have already evolved in time (in e.g. other hominids) before 
language evolved.  
Currently, an exact date for when pointing behaviour first originated 
cannot be provided. If there is a pointing-gene complex as postulated by 
Buttersworth and Tomasello, then the origin of this gene (complex) is fixed in 
time and once this gene is discovered one can trace it back to its origin as well 
as map how it spread throughout the human (or hominid) population. On the 
other hand, following Leavens’ and co-workers’ ideas on pointing, it is likely 
that pointing arose multiple times and continues to do so.  
When the pointing behaviour first arose in time depends on the origin of 
the subunits, mechanisms and levels involved in pointing, as well as when they 
first got combined into the pointing behaviour. The curling of the fingers and 
the extension of the index finger might for example have evolve later as a 
clarification of the message (to for example distinguish it from mere hand 
extension in humans, which might be interpreted as a request to be held). 
Moreover, if pointing evolves spontaneously due to individual (e.g. as an “aha-
erlebnis”); or collective, cognitive learning processes (e.g. the ratchet effect); 
or in relation to certain ecological or cultural settings (environmental and/or 
cultural niche construction); then pointing evolve(d)/(s) several times. In this 
case, it needs to be investigated when the conditions that enable pointing to 
arise were first present. 
The date(s) can be further narrowed down as follows. It is a universal 
human trait, thus it arose (once or multiple times) in our species. Some of the 
subunits are already present in great apes, apes and monkeys (e.g. inspection 
of the environment with the index-finger). These primates are able to at least 
extend their arms or all their fingers (thus the physiology and motor maps 
required to do so need to have already evolved in these species).  
Because it is unclear when pointing first arose, and when language evolved, 
it is also impossible to date when pointing became a unit in language evolution 
specifically. Nonetheless, the differences between human and non-human 
primate pointing, indicate that it might have first evolved in the hominid 
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lineage, and that it underwent further specialized evolution in the Homo 
lineage.  
It might be a topic of discussion whether the curling of the fingers, 
opposable thumbs, and highly mobile thumbs are a requirement that already 
needs to be in place. If it is, one can eliminate the origin of canonical pointing 
in most non-human primate species, because they lack the fine motor abilities 
to point canonically. Paleo-anthropological, anatomical research can then be 
consulted to further narrow down the date.  
On the other hand, one might ask whether hands are required for the 
pointing behaviour to evolve in time. Dogs for example, during their hunting 
activities, often point with one paw to their pray (a behaviour that was already 
described by Darwin). Is the latter a nonverbal referential/communicative 
behaviour? If so, the origin of pointing surpasses the origin of primates and 
millions of years are added to the timeframe when pointing possibly evolved, 
and when it became relevant in language evolution. 
Timing the evolution of pointing and inquiring about the constancy of the 
unit, once it evolved, allows one to further specify and constrain which aspects 
of the pointing behaviour are actually involved in the evolution of language. 
More specifically, it allows to differentiate between those aspects that are 
genuine units in the evolution of language; those aspects of pointing that might 
be involved in other kinds of evolution (e.g. the evolution of problem-solving, 
ToM, intentionality, etc.); and which aspects of pointing are, at best, mere 
windows (Botha, 2006) on the evolution of language.  
Examples of such windows are imperative or declarative, indexical or full-
finger extended pointing both in institutionalized or language-trained apes as 
well as in currently living children. Neither these apes, nor these children were 
part of the initial situation in which language evolved. At best, they allow to 
draw inferences on the initial condition and as such they are windows on the 
evolution of language 
How Does Pointing Interact with other Units of Language Evolution? (4) 
This question again allows the identification of other units of language 
evolution because it asks whether or not pointing can be divided into subunits 
(e.g. index-finger pointing, foot pointing, etc.) and grouped into superunits 
(e.g. nonverbal behaviour, cultural behaviour etc.). These questions again 
allow one to further constrain as well as generate research avenues. 
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The following sub-units of the behaviour can be distinguished: Canonical 
pointing (which is further divided into the following units: index-finger 
extension, the curling of the fingers, the downward holding of the thumb, the 
extension of the arm), middle finger pointing, pointing with all fingers 
extended, foot pointing, imperative pointing, and declarative pointing. 
Pointing might be part of superunits such as non-verbal referential 
behaviour, non-verbal communication, symbolic behaviour, problem-solving 
behaviour, intentional behaviour, cultural behaviour. These superunit(s) might 
also be units of language evolution in and of themselves, and the study of 
pointing therefore implicates, and validates an independent study of these 
phenomena as possible units of language evolution. 
The independent investigation of each sub- and superunit will allow one to 
separate the irrelevant from the relevant ones and might also allow the 
identification of windows on language evolution. Many of these sub- and 
superunits in turn are likely to also be units in the evolution of culture, 
sociality, problem-solving, etc. and as such, the elements that make up the 
pointing behaviour are neither directly nor exclusively involved in language 
evolution. 
When a possible superunit such as “cultural behaviour” is in turn 
investigated as a possible unit of language evolution, in its division into 
subunits, it will implicate a multitude of units, levels and mechanisms that are 
(possibly) involved in language evolution. As such, a rather simple behaviour 
such as pointing can provide the scientific justification for the introduction of a 
multitude of scientific research avenues in evolutionary linguistics. Problem-
solving and symbolic behaviour can be implicated in the evolution of 
intentional behaviour, and all three can be implicated in the evolution of 
cognition. Symbolic behaviour, non-verbal and verbal communication are 
involved in the evolution of humans and perhaps also other hominins. 
Pointing as a superunit (or theoretical concept) can also include: pointing 
in wild apes, pointing in home-reared apes, pointing in institutionalized apes, 
and pointing in humans. Also the pointing with the right hand, the presence of 
an audience, visual contact with the pointed object and the social partner (via 
eye gazing), attention-getting behaviour, attention-directing behaviour, 
persistence in attention getting behaviour and vocalisations, intentionality, etc. 
can be considered units in the (series of) behaviour(s) that are denoted as 
pointing. 
 Pointing  and the Evolution of Language 13 
 
How Relevant is Pointing for (Studies on) Language Evolution? (6) 
The importance of the unit can be evaluated by asking about the relevance of 
the unit, both in the actual evolution of language as well as in theory formation 
on the evolution of language. This is done by asking whether pointing is 
necessary and/or sufficient for language to evolve.  
Although many of the questions raised require further examination, 
pointing probably is neither sufficient, nor necessary for language to evolve. It 
is not sufficient, because we know that the evolution of language also requires 
the evolution of other anatomical and behavioural features such as the descent 
of the larynx, the evolution of Broca and Wernicke’s area, and so forth. 
Ontogenetically, pointing might facilitate certain aspects of language 
acquisition, as is demonstrated by studies that indicate significant correlations 
between babbling, the first and two word phases. But blind or physically 
impaired children are able to learn language, so pointing is not necessary to 
learn language. Whether the evolution of pointing was necessary for language 
to evolve phylogenetically, remains open for discussion. Nonetheless, this does 
not exclude the possibility that pointing has contributed and continues to 
contribute to the origin and evolution of language. 
On a meta-level, research on pointing therefore is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient aspect of a theory on the evolution of language.  
3.1.3. The No-Phase 
If scholars are not able to identify pointing as a unit of language evolution, they 
are advised to examine whether it is a level and/or mechanism of language 
evolution. These possibilities are discussed during the next two heuristics 
(table 2 and 3). 
3.2. Conclusion on Pointing as a Unit of Language Evolution 
Implementing the unit-heuristic into pointing research has introduced a 
multitude of new research questions and avenues. As a philosopher, it is not my 
place to answer most of these questions. The unit heuristic generates a series 
of questions that are currently not addressed and that require rigorous 
scientific attention of the psychological, primatological or evolutionary 
linguistic community. This heuristic is designed to systematize, constrain, 
generate and evaluate phenomena such as pointing so that one can build 
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systematic theories on pointing and other phenomena and their role in the 
evolutionary origin of language. As such, it is amazing how the investigation of 
pointing as a possible unit of language evolution is able to generate as well as 
justify the investigation of a series of events, mechanisms and phenomena as 
possible units, levels and mechanisms of language evolution. 
4. Is Pointing a Level of Language Evolution? 
In the previous section it was already demonstrated that pointing is a superunit 
or agglomeration of different behavioural and possibly also cognitive 
components. Pointing is thus decomposable into many different 
subcomponents or subunits. This makes it likelier that pointing itself also 
functions as a level for at least some of its subcomponents, or, stated otherwise, 
that pointing is actually a location where certain subcomponents such as 
intentionality, or index-finger extension evolve. Table 2 outlines how we can 
study pointing as a level of language evolution. 
4.1. Discussion of Table 2 
4.1.1. The Question Mark Phase (1) 
As it is uncertain whether pointing functions as a level where other types of 
behaviour can evolve, the level-heuristic recommends to try and prove that 
pointing is a level of language evolution and thus to go to the yes-phase of the 
heuristic. 
4.1.2. The Yes Phase (2–8) 
Identifying Pointing as a Level of Language Evolution (2) 
How does one prove that pointing is a level of language evolution? One can 
prove that pointing is a level of language evolution if one can prove that 
language evolution units evolve at the level of pointing, or when evolutionary 
mechanisms can be identified that are active at the level of pointing. Either two 
research routes function as control mechanisms for each other, because the 
detection and investigation of units will also lend insight into the mechanisms  
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Table 2. Is pointing a level in/of language evolution? 
(read from left to right and top-down) 
? 1. Try to prove that pointing is a level of evolution (1 example suffices). 
Thus go to yes. 
YES 
 
2. How many/which 
units evolve at this 
level? 
Not one unit, pointing is not a level of 
evolution, go to no. 
One/multiple unit(s)? Identify them all. 
(Justifies that pointing is a level.) 
3. How many 
evolutionary 
mechanisms are active 
at (not on) this level?  
Equals the question: how many evolutionary 
mechanisms are active upon the units that 
evolve at this level. (testing device) 
4. What is the 
ontological status of 
the level? 
The level is an abstract notion that facilitates 
theory formation/ an existing entity. 
5. Since when?  
 
Locate the origin of pointing in time or when 
it becomes necessary to invoke pointing as an 
abstract notion in the theory of language 
evolution  
6. How does this level 
pointing interact with 
other levels?  
Can this level be divided into sublevels? If so, 
are they also levels in language evolution? 
Can this level be absorbed into superlevels? If 
so, are they also levels in language evolution? 
7. Can this level also 
be regarded as a unit 
and/or mechanism of 
evolution?  
? & yes: try and treat the level as a unit and/or 
mechanism, go to unit and/or mechanism. 
8. Relevance? Is the level pointing sufficient and/or 
necessary for evolution? 
NO 9. Unit and/or 
mechanism? 
? or Yes: go to unit and/or mechanism. 
No: treat pointing as irrelevant for evolution 
until proven otherwise. 
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that are active on the units (at that level); and the investigation of the 
mechanisms that are active at the level will lend an insight into the units that 
evolve at the level of pointing. 
Possible units that manifest themselves at least partly through pointing are: 
the single word phase, two-word-phase, ToM, intentionality, problem-solving, 
emotionality, sociality, attention sharing, nonverbal communication, 
vocalisations, and verbal communication. That is, pointing can be a vehicle, a 
means to express all the above. And pointing can therefore be one of the levels 
or loci where evolutionary mechanisms become active on those units. ToM and 
intentionality partly shape pointing; vocalisations and verbal communication 
sometimes accompany pointing in ape and infant pointing; pointing requires 
an audience and thus a social environment; certain forms of pointing arise in 
relation to an emotional environment. 
The fact that these units might evolve at the level of pointing does not 
necessarily make pointing a level of language evolution (it might simply make 
pointing a level in the evolution of problem-solving, for example). Thus, the 
heuristic recommends to test whether these elements are also units in language 
evolution (and thus whether they were part of the initial condition from 
wherefrom language evolved) or if they merely provide windows on the 
evolution of language. Only when the units that evolve at the pointing level are 
actual language units, is it proven that pointing is a level of language evolution. 
Moreover, identifying language units that evolve at the level of pointing 
does not imply that these units exclusively evolve at the level of pointing. 
Rather, these units can be expressed at the pointing level and as such they can 
be prone to change, but they can also be expressed at other levels, such as the 
cognitive or the cultural level. In other words, pointing can serve as a vehicle 
where these units are expressed and as such, pointing is one level where these 
units can possibly evolve.  
Which evolutionary mechanisms are active upon this level equals the 
question, how does ToM, intentionality, problem-solving, emotionality, 
sociality (e.g. attention sharing), nonverbal communication, vocalisations and 
verbal communication evolve? These questions require rigorous scientific 
investigation that is beyond the scope of the present article. 
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Examining Pointing as a Level of Language Evolution (4–8) 
As soon as one or multiple language evolution units are identified to be 
subjected to a certain evolutionary mechanism at this pointing level, the 
heuristic again generates questions that allow one to systematize, constrain as 
well as evaluate the pointing level. 
The Ontological Status of Pointing as a Level of Language Evolution (4) 
Before being able to recursively ask the same questions in regard to the level as 
in regard to the unit, in the level-heuristic one additional question needs to be 
raised regarding the ontological status of the level. 
Although pointing behaviour can quite simply be referred to in space in an 
ostensive manner as something that exists, levels such as “culture” or a 
“language community” cannot. It therefore becomes necessary to clarify 
whether the level under investigation is a real existing unit or a theoretical 
concept that is introduced to pragmatically facilitate theory formation. 
“Pointing” is a theoretical concept that has been used to refer to a variety of 
phenomena that are either of a behavioural, cognitive or linguistic kind. Many 
of the sub-units of pointing exist in individuals (the index-finger, the thumb, 
arm, …). Pointing can also be regarded as a level of evolution in that sense that 
it is a “vehicle” or a “level of expression” of certain types of behaviour. In this 
regard, an analogy can be draw between genes and the phenotype. According 
the Modern Synthesis, genes can only be the target of selection if they are 
phenotypically expressed and as such tested in a certain environment (a gene 
for blue eyes for example can only become the target of selection when it is 
phenotypically expressed). Likewise, ToM, intentionality, etc. can only evolve 
if there exists  a medium where such behaviour is expressed. The level of 
pointing is one of those physical media. 
In this regard, one can also ask if the vocalisations, the social context, the 
emotional context, etc. are part of the level of pointing. Do they need to be 
present in order for units such as ToM to be expressed and to evolve at this 
level? 
When Did Pointing Become a Level in Language Evolution? (5) 
This question on the ontological status of a level is especially relevant for the 
“since when” question. It is only useful to investigate when the level originated 
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in time when it is an actual existing entity. Otherwise, one has to specify when 
it becomes necessary to introduce pointing as a level in language evolution at a 
theoretical level. 
The origin of pointing as a physical vehicle or level in time (for other units), 
depends to a large extent on the origin of pointing as a unit. The pointing 
behaviour has to exist before it can serve as a level for the evolution of other 
units. 
How does the Pointing Level Interact with other Levels? (6) 
The heuristic proposes a series of questions that again allow one to 
systematically search for other levels of language evolution, as well as units and 
mechanisms. 
As an existing behaviour, the subunits (described above), might also be 
sublevels of language evolution. Possible superlevels are the level of motor-
control, the level of non-verbal behaviour, or the level of culture. 
How Relevant is Pointing as a Level for Language Evolution? (7) 
The heuristic enables one to evaluate the importance of pointing in both the 
evolution of language as well as in the theories on the evolution of language. 
As it is clear that other levels are implicated where language evolved, it can 
be concluded that pointing is neither sufficient nor necessary for language to 
have evolved, and theories on language evolution therefore cannot exclusively 
focus on pointing. 
4.1.3. The No Phase (9) 
A level of language evolution can only be identified as such if one can find units 
that evolve at that level by means of certain mechanisms. If one cannot identify 
either of these two, then pointing is not a level of language evolution. 
4.2. Conclusion on Pointing as a Level of Language Evolution 
This heuristic again demonstrates how a multitude of questions are generated 
by the systematic examination of pointing as a level of language evolution and, 
more importantly, how it also justifies a multitude of research routes. 
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Furthermore, on a meta-level, the heuristics enable insight into theory 
formation on language evolution, by explaining how relevant a certain research 
topic is to build theories. 
5. Is Pointing a Mechanism of Language Evolution? 
Before we can turn to table 3, some general notes on evolutionary mechanisms 
need to be made because by now, the reader will have wondered what exactly is 
denoted with the concept “evolution” or “evolutionary mechanism”. Why 
regard pointing as a “kind of evolution” rather than a “behavioural”, 
“developmental” or “cultural” trait? Or why, in table 1, understand operant 
conditioning (in the wake of Skinner, 1986 himself) as an “evolutionary 
mechanism” and not just as a “mechanism” or a simple “learning or teaching 
strategy”? Today, numerous theories and cultural intuitions withhold us from 
recognizing the latter as “kinds of evolution” or “evolutionary processes”. 
I am reluctant to rigidly define “evolution” or “evolutionary mechanism” or 
to exclude the above as either one of the latter, for the following reasons. 
Historically, because evolution was first “discovered” in biology, the idea has 
always been that only life or biological organisms evolve, and that they 
exclusively evolve by means of natural selection. Evolutionary theory however 
has today progressed up to the point that it recognizes a myriad of different 
evolutionary mechanisms, such as drift, symbiogenesis, lateral gene transfer, 
etc. The consequence is that today, it becomes legitimate to investigate just 
how many evolutionary mechanisms exist and how they facilitate the evolution 
of various phenomena associated with life. 
Darwin already made it very obvious that natural selection is a mechanism 
that requires the presence of certain measurable conditions, such as heredity, a 
struggle for existence etc. If we consistently think these ideas through, this also 
means that it is not the mechanism that, like some “force” or “law”, determines 
how evolution will occur, but that it are the material conditions that determine 
the (type of) mechanism.  
It follows that mechanisms are not “out there”, waiting to be discovered. 
Rather, a series of measurable conditions under which something emerges or 
changes (i.e. evolves), are waiting to be identified as evolutionary mechanisms.  
For evolution to occur by means of natural selection for example, according 
to Campbell (1974), elements needs to vary blindly, and some of these 
elements needs to be selected and retained through time. When such “blind 
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variation and selective retention” occurs, it is argued that something evolved 
by means of natural selection. Natural selection is therefore not a constant 
force but a series of measurable events that are denoted as “natural selection”. 
And these conditions can be summed up in heuristics (Campbell, 1974; 
Ploktin, 1995). The most important contribution of evolutionary epistemology 
has been the abstraction of several EE-formulas of evolutionary theories such 
as natural selection (Campbell, 1974; Plotkin, 1994 and see Gontier, 2007 
for such a formula on symbiogenesis). These formulas point out the conditions 
that need to be met in order for evolution to occur by means of a specific 
mechanism.  
In sum, mechanisms are processes that occur under well-defined and 
measurable conditions whereby change is induced. Conceived of in this way, 
an evolutionary mechanism need not always be as exotic as natural selection or 
symbiogenesis for example. Rather, as soon as one can identify a series of 
conditions by which something changes, one can call this series of conditions a 
mechanism whereby something evolves. It is very deliberating to regard 
evolution simply as change and evolutionary mechanisms simply as those 
conditions that need to be met in order for change to be inflicted upon 
something in a certain manner.  
The potential of such a view is enormous and is also evident when we 
examine pointing as a possible mechanism in language evolution. Pointing is a 
behaviour that can inflict change in other types of behaviour. That is, pointing 
can change the way in which intentionality is expressed, in which the one- and 
two-word phase develop, etc. Because these behaviours are changed by 
pointing, it is interesting to ask whether we can also understand pointing as an 
evolutionary mechanism of language evolution (table 3). 
5.1. Discussion of Table 3 
Turning to the heuristic, it again recursively recommends that in an uncertain 
situation, one needs to try and prove that pointing is a mechanism involved in 
the evolution of language (1). 
Similarly to the level phase, one can prove that pointing is a mechanism if 
one can identify units whereupon pointing is active (2), and if one can identify 
levels whereat pointing is active (3). Both serve as control mechanisms for one 
another, since the identification of units will lend insight into the levels where 
these units evolve and vice versa, the identification of levels will identify units.  
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Table 3. Is pointing a mechanism involved in language evolution? 
(read from left to right and top-down) 
? 1. Try to prove that pointing is an evolutionary mechanism involved in evolution. 
Thus go to yes. 
YES 2. On how many 
units is this 
evolutionary 
mechanism 
working? 
Not one unit: pointing is not a mechanism involved in 
language evolution. 
One/multiple unit(s). Identify them all. 
(Justifies that pointing is a mechanism involved in 
evolution.) 
3. At (not on) how 
many levels is this 
mechanism active? 
Equals the question: the units that are subjected to this 
evolutionary mechanism, at how many levels are they 
subjected to it? 
4. How does the mechanism work? Which conditions need to be met in order for 
the evolutionary mechanism to occur? Answer requires (universal) EE formulas of 
the workings of the mechanism. 
5. Since when? 
 
Locate in time when these conditions are met regarding 
each unit and each level = when the evolutionary mechanism 
became a mechanism involved in language evolution at that 
unit and/or level. 
6. How does this 
pointing mechanism 
interact with other 
mechanisms?  
Can this mechanism be divided into sub-mechanism(s)? 
(Depends on the presence of sub conditions.) If so, are they 
also mechanisms of language evolution? 
Can this mechanism be absorbed into a super-
mechanism(s)? (Depends on the existence of a mechanism 
that allows to combine different mechanisms into one single 
mechanism.) If so, are they also mechanisms of evolution? 
7. Can this 
mechanism also be 
regarded as a unit 
and/or level of 
evolution? 
? & yes: try and treat the mechanism as a unit and/or level, 
go to unit and/or level. 
8. Relevance? Is the mechanism pointing sufficient and/or necessary for 
evolution?  
NO 9. Unit and/or level?  ? or Yes: go to unit and/or level.  
No: treat pointing as irrelevant for evolution until proven otherwise. 
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Possible language units that evolve by means of (the mechanism of) 
pointing are perhaps the one and two-word phase, referential communication, 
intentional communication and attention-sharing. This can be proven if we can 
attribute causation to pointing, and falsified if we cannot. For example, 
pointing could be a mechanism for the one or two word phase if we can 
demonstrate that pointing causes, triggers or induces the production of single 
words under certain, recurring circumstances. This in turn would imply that 
there would exist a cognitive or neurological relation between the production 
of pointing and the production of single words. Whether this is the case needs 
to be examined. 
Specific to the mechanism heuristic is the question: how does the 
mechanism work (4)? Which conditions need to be met in order for evolution 
to occur through pointing? At this stage, the heuristic again starts to generate 
questions that allow one to systematically study the mechanism. And it is here 
that AEE and philosophy of biology can again contribute in a major way, i.e. by 
examining which universal conditions need to be met in order for a certain 
evolutionary mechanism to occur.  
In regard to natural selection, evolutionary epistemologists such as 
Campbell and David Hull for example, have identified the conditions under 
which natural selection occurs in the form of EE-formulas or heuristics. 
Campbell “universalized” natural selection theory and freed it from genetic 
research. Not only genes, but all entities that evolve according to the blind 
variation ans selective retention formula can be argued to evolve by means of 
natural selection. 
As such, it would be an interesting intellectual exercise to identify the 
conditions that need to be met in order for pointing to occur. Leavens has 
already been engaged in this activity. Pointing as an act of nonverbal reference 
occurs when the following 4 conditions are met: there must be social interplay, 
visual orienting behaviour, putative attention-getting behaviour, and 
persistence (Leavens, 2004; Leavens, Russell & Hopkins, 2005). According 
to Leavens, pointing can only be argued to occur under these circumstances. 
One could also investigate whether these conditions necessarily need to be in 
place before change can be induced in nonverbal communication by pointing. 
It is a challenge for scientists to investigate what kind of (ir)reversible 
behavioural responses pointing can induce, alter or change when these 
conditions are met and whether one could argue that these changes are of an 
evolutionary nature. 
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Afterwards, the heuristic again recursively introduces questions that allow 
one to systematize, constrain and evaluate the importance of pointing as a 
mechanism (5–8). Most of these questions cannot be answered yet and also the 
idea that pointing can be regarded as a mechanism of language evolution, in 
line with natural selection, is a highly tentative suggestion. 
Nonetheless, this example again shows how the heuristic is obliging us to 
re-conceptualize certain aspects of evolutionary research. 
6. Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated how pointing can be implemented and investigated 
from within the three evolutionary epistemological heuristics. Guidelines were 
given to how we can investigate whether pointing can be characterized as a 
unit, level or mechanism of language evolution. All three applications have 
generated as well as constrained research avenues on pointing. Furthermore, 
the study of pointing not only implicates, but also justifies the investigation of a 
multitude of additional (possible) units, levels and mechanisms of language 
evolution. Finally, it is also demonstrated how the relevance of pointing for the 
evolutionary origin of language can be evaluated.  
It remains bizarre to understand units (simultaneously) as possible levels 
and mechanisms or vice versa, levels as possible units and mechanisms or even 
mechanisms as possible units and levels. Nonetheless, the rather simple 
behaviour that pointing is, allows us to assume that the former might at least 
hold some truth. But even if pointing is, at best, merely a unit of language 
evolution, the above example aptly demonstrates that the implementation of 
the AEE-heuristic into evolutionary linguistics generates new research 
questions and new avenues of research. Moreover, it allows to ground every 
step along the way.  
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